One may call this the phenomenon of 'the research gap'. It is attributed generally to the absence of a new knowledge base from which breakthroughs will emerge at times of technological readiness.
For the American Government, the research gap has caused political embarrassment. The research budget of the National Institutes of Health, which is over $800 million for the current year, was brought to that level by promises of breakthrough if only enough funds were provided by Congress. Now legislators, wondering about fulfilment of promises, have been holding back on additional funding.
The major pharmaceutical companies have been increasing their investments in research for the simple reason that innovation is the life-stuff of the entrepreneurial system. 'Innovate or perish' is the industrial equivalent of the wellknown academic slogan. In Britain, too, the industrial commitment to medicinal research is rather substantial, relative to the gross national product.
There have been some acrimonious exchanges between American drug interests and the Food and Drug Administration over the reasons for the research gap. Industry says that the FDA review procedures are oppressive, exceed what is needed for reasonable judgments and uselessly divert the talents and energies of research and development personnel who otherwise could engage in more creative pursuits.
In rebuttal, the FDA says that it is merely demanding full or adequate data presentation in support of new drug applications and is not holding back from the market any important new drugs which, it argues, have simply not come out of the research laboratories.
As in most matters, truth is to be found on both sides. The FDA is correct in that there is a research gap not directly related to regulatory practices. On the other hand, the industry is able to point to Britain where a simpler review mechanismthe Committee on Safety of Drugs, soon to become part of the new Medicines Commissionmakes it possible for new drugs to reach the public months, or years, before they might do so in America. These are not the cures for cancer, heart disease and arthritis which people want, but they add significantly to the doctor's total armamentarium.
One can add, in support of the industry argument, that no evidence has been forthcoming to show that the lean-and-spare apparatus of British drug safety has put the public at greater risk than is the case in America where drug applications spend years in review at staggering costs for both government and industry.
All of this jousting with paper spears across the table is but a manifestation of a larger phenomenon whose attributes have been but little identified and even less understood. It is that all progress tends to be inhibited by spontaneously arising negative forces which, if not checked, neutralized, or deliberately removed, eventually offset or kill the progress with which they are associated.
In the biological area, for example, the phenomena of bacterial resistance to antibiotics and of biochemical accommodation by individuals to drug dosages are well known. Innovators have been variously successful in outwitting nature in both situations while sensing that they are merely buying time for new skirmishes which may be expected.
In a curiously analogous way, progress of any sort tends to be counterforced by behavioural elements from the human or social sectors. The starting point in the cycle of innovation is the incentive. For the traditional investigator, free to choose his area of inquiry, the incentive is the pursuit of knowledge, nudged along by curiosity, desire for professional attainment and reward and, more recently, public acclaim and award. Humanitarianism per se may enter but may not be significantly pertinent.
For the firm, the incentive is frankly economic. Financial risks will be taken so long as there are 48l Library (Scientific Research) Section prospects of greater gains in the long run. Idealists might hope otherwise, but if they prevail, they can only destroy private risk-taking and private innovation. The question remains then whether government can generate the incentives through its own minions. As to this there must be some doubts.
Given the incentive, the investigator will materialize or recognize the phenomena which lead to breakthrough and eventually to successful dissemination. The latter is not self-manifesting, notwithstanding the beliefs of rationalists and utopians. Between recognition and dissemination lie fields of technological hurdles which demand expenditure of innovational energies. A classical example of this is the penicillin story.
Once the product is marketed it must find its place in practical usage. Claims will be made for it. Physicians must be told of it and must, if they believe the claims, learn about the prescriptive attributes of the product. All of this, too, will take place only if there be incentives for change.
In fact, dissemination of new drugs sometimes works too well, considering the enthusiasms of promoters and believers. It has often been observed that a new drug or treatment had best be used in its early stages of adoption when enthusiasm is at its greatest and before negative feedbacks become sufficiently great to be believed.
If the innovation is unique and important it will cause ripples of excitement and sequential innovation within the community of biomedical enterprise, especially if new knowledge or biological phenomena should be at its base. The great advances stemming from development of both the sulphonamides and the antibiotics come to mind. Also recalled is the fact that exploitation of the penicillin observation was made possible by the success of the sulphonamides. It is notable, too, that the exploitation of the latter continues in numerous useful ways, a case in point being the utilization of a hypoglycwmic effect of a sulphonamide for the control of diabetic symptoms.
Eventually, however, there is a subsiding of the exploitations and enthusiasms stemming from a grand innovation. A settling-in period emerges during which critics and systematizers begin collecting experience, modifying claims and usages. The great preoccupation with drug safety represents a natural evolution of counterforce in innovation. Unfortunately, political preoccupation with drug safety can become an end in itself, as in the United States, where the issues have been seized by journalists, politicians, economic partisans, and those who have a stake in the engineering of control. The latter include whole new classes of technicians who specialize in the ordering of phenomena within larger social contexts while not adding creatively to social advance.
The hedging in of innovation in medicine takes many forms. There is, primarily, the insistence on demonstration of safety and efficacy. As there is no assurance of absolute safety, whether because of factors inherent in the product, the prescriber, the patient, or the patient's situation, one can see that insistence on absolute safety is not realistic. Its pursuitfor reasons ofjournalistic and political opportunism as well as professional sub-optimizationcan only thwart innovation. True, administrators will speak of the balancing of benefits and risks, but on the side of the latter they understandably add the political fortuities.
The broadening of knowledge of biological process serves both to advance and to inhibit progress. The former is self-evident. Inhibition works rather curiously. It could be at its best when limits are defined on the basis of proven observation. Unfortunately for the advancement of new methods, inhibition tends to be at its worst as professional criticsthose whose roles are to be suchpropound limits on the basis of conjecture as to what could or might occur notwithstanding absence of evidence. The unknown can paralyse action whereas the knowns, even the negative ones, can stimulate further innovation.
Then there is a growing preoccupation with efficacy. Linked to assessment of biological safety, the judgment of efficacy is in itself less than utterly rational, though necessary. When, however, efficacy is assessed as a problem in itself, it engenders a process of soul-purification which may put a greater reliance on rationality in human behaviour, whether of prescriber or patient, than can ever be found in real life.
Little is actually known, beyond the occasional literary or conversational fragment, of the forces of counter-innovation. What complicates their understanding is that each, when it is at best, represents a measure of rationality. But it is a rationality out of context. It sub-optimizes. It deifies form while it debases function.
One could create a large catalogue of suboptimal elements which advance the cause of neatness in accordance with particular views while inhibiting technological advance in the service of society. A distinction must be made here. Advances which serve only to control are necessary, but they do not add creatively to social benefit. Hence, since control tends to grow as an end in itself and since there are organizations and people whose sole business it is to control, society must find inexpensive ways of limiting or controlling the controllers.
Least costly, most effective, and most difficult to achieve would be a framework of commanding not merely guidingphilosophy which would lend perspective to the judgment of social leaders and agents, both lay and professional. It is neither realistic nor desirable to think of inhibiting critical journalists, politicians, economic reformers and sundry technologists. All make their contributions, notwithstanding some tendency to magnify what they perceive or to see it utterly out of the context of the complex interweavings of natural and social forces.
It is a paradox that society eagerly encourages vast public expenditure for medical research in the hope that this will lead to diagnostic and therapeutic advances while, on the other hand, inhibiting the private enterprise of research for fear that someone might profit thereby. It is even more paradoxical that the control of profits is pursued at a substantial cost to society as though it were the expression of an ethic of self-denial. It would seem most important to foster creativity for only thereby might society profit most despite the marginal enrichment of a few.
The commanding philosophy should seek its own guidance from clarification of social aims. Thus will the directions of effort be clarified. Undesirable outcomes can never be avoided. Hence, the commanding philosophy should recognize that, since innovation feeds on itself, it is better to get on with it while correcting for and controlling mainly the extremes. This holds true both technologically and economically.
There will never be the perfect drug, the perfect doctor, the perfect patient. To hold up progress until all is known about a drug is not in the social interest, for the drug will then never emerge. To insist on informing the doctor perfectly about all the properties of a drug for all his patients' probable circumstances is also not feasible, for then the doctor, having to deploy so much of his time in reading and learning, might not have enough left over to attend to the elastic and insatiable demands of his patients. While communication from the drug house to the physician is not ideal, neither is communication solely from university or hospital to the doctor. Both have advantages. Neither, however, is without disadvantage.
One may conclude briefly, then, having touched only slightly on some of the problems of a sociology or behavioural framework of innovation, by urging that more attention be given to it. There is no rationality, really, except in the perceptions of non-rational and often highly persuasive beholders. The issue may, perhaps, be stated as whether it is to be an unattainable rationality or utopian state which is to prevail or whether it is to be an imperfect yet enjoyable progress.
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Public Responsibility and Industrial Freedom
It is not possible, nor is it appropriate, to attempt a wide-ranging descriptive analysis of the many problems that arise in seeking a reconciliation in modern society between industrial freedom and public responsibility. The industrialist is not free, nor has he been so for a very long time, to manufacture goods of his invention where and how he will, nor can he bring them to the market without regard for the interests of consumers. Over the last century legislation and statutory rules and orders made thereunder have enforced the observation of minimal standards of conduct in relations with staff, shareholders, customers and the community at large, while the growth of trade unions, financial institutions, consumer associations and of direct government intervention has had a profound influence in raising the standards of performance well beyond the minima required by law. In a dynamic industrial society subject to rapid technological change, it is inevitable that these relationships should themselves be subject to change, and our purpose is, therefore, to consider some of the problems that exist in the field that is of especial interest to this Section, namely, the invention, manufacture and sale of drugs and medicines.
All change in pharmaceutical industry stems from one fundamental freedomto search for and develop new drugs, and the medicines based upon them, that increase the doctors' ability to prevent or cure disease. It does not follow that all
